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ABSTRACT Industry 4.0 heavily builds on massive deployment of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)
devices to monitor every aspect of the manufacturing processes. Since the data gathered by these devices
impact the output of critical processes, identity management and communications security are critical
aspects, which commonly rely on the deployment of X.509 certificates. Nevertheless, the provisioning and
management of individual certificates for a high number of IIoT devices involves important challenges.
In this paper, we present a solution to improve the management of digital certificates in IIoT environments,
which relies on partially delegating the certificate enrolment process to an edge server. However, in order to
preserve end-to-end security, private keys are never delegated. Additionally, for the protection of the commu-
nications between the edge server and the IIoT devices, an approach based on Identity Based Cryptography
is deployed. The proposed solution considers also the issuance of very short-lived certificates, which reduces
the risk of using expired or compromised certificates, and avoids the necessity of implementing performance
expensive protocols such as Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). The proposed solution has been
successfully tested as an efficient identity management solution for IIoT environments in a real industrial
environment.
INDEX TERMS Automatic enrolment, IIoT, Industry 4.0, SCEP, X.509.
I. INTRODUCTION
The next industrial revolution is known as Industry 4.0 and
mainly seeks to enhance the efficiency, security and relia-
bility of manufacturing processes, resulting in higher quality
products, greater traceability and reduction of manufacturing
costs. The main idea to materialize these goals is to replace
slow, costly and error-prone manual procedures with reliable
and efficient computer-based automatic systems. In order to
achieve this aim, massive data gathering supported by Indus-
trial Internet of Things (IIoT) devices and networks plays
a key role. These data could then be used to feed specific
machine learning, automation and orchestration algorithms
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targeted at improving efficiency, predicting failures, etc. This
is graphically represented in Figure 1, where all manufac-
turing processes in the outermost circle are monitored with
IIoT devices. Then, the data analysis and decision-making
processes in the middle circle make use of the data gathered
by the IIoT devices. And in the centre of it all stands identity
management, as an essential ingredient to make the whole
system trustworthy.
In such a context, where the information gathered by IIoT
devices commands production level decisions, strong secu-
rity is a must [1], [2]. This includes reliable authentication
and access control mechanisms, as well as data encryption.
In order to implement such security services, two main
approaches are possible: (1) to distribute shared secret keys
and use symmetric cryptographic algorithms; or (2) solutions
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FIGURE 1. Industry 4.0 manufacturing processes based on data gathered
by IIoT devices.
based on Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) and digital certifi-
cates, which rely on public key cryptographic mechanisms.
The distribution of shared secret keys implies scalability
issues, specially when all the involved parties do not belong
to the same organization. For this reason, PKI-based alter-
natives are preferred to implement strong security mecha-
nisms in open environments. However, the utilization of PKIs
implies also important challenges, specially when massively
deployed resource-deprived devices are involved, as in the
case of IIoT-based industrial scenarios.
On the one hand, the implementation and execution of
public key cryptographic algorithms requires extensive use of
CPU and memory; resources that are only limitedly available
in most IIoT devices [3], [4]. For the majority of IIoT devices,
such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), this results
in long computation times of public key cryptographic opera-
tions. On the other hand, apart from the performance-related
problems inherent to the hardware characteristics of IIoT
devices, another important challenge is related to their mas-
sive deployment [5], [6], as they are extensively used to gather
data of all the possible aspects of manufacturing processes.
When relying on PKI-based security mechanisms, each indi-
vidual entity and service, including IIoT devices, must own a
digital certificate that reliably links its identity with its corre-
sponding public key. The management of thousands of digital
certificates implies an important organizational challenge for
current industrial plants, specially when most IIoT devices
do not have a screen and keyboard to make certificate request
easier; or a clock with the actual time and date, to aid in the
certificate renewal process.
Another issue related to the use of digital certificates is
associated with certificate revocation and checking. In fact,
existing mechanisms to protect from compromised certifi-
cates such as the use of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
or the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) have
demonstrated to be highly resource-expensive and of lim-
ited effectiveness [7]. Such problems are even more trou-
blesome in IIoT environments, where networks are more
dynamic, with devices entering or leaving the network
more frequently, and where these little devices are more
exposed to security attacks. As a consequence, the size
of CRLs grows and their management, update and query
become important challenges. For all these reasons, most
novel approaches are promoting the issuance of ever more
short-lived certificates [8], [9]. The use of short-lived cer-
tificates eliminates the need of managing and checking
revoked certificates and enhances the overall network secu-
rity, by minimizing the possibility of accepting compromised
certificates before they expire. However, short-lived certifi-
cates present also performance and organizational-level chal-
lenges. In contexts where a high number of certificates must
be issued every few days or hours, certificate (re)enrolment
processes might become a bottleneck [10].
Therefore, the main contribution of this paper is a reli-
able and efficient identity management system for IIoT
devices. The main goal of this system is to simplify the iden-
tity management for IIoT devices, moving the complexity
associated to this process from the resource-deprived IIoT
devices to a more resource-rich edge server. More specifi-
cally, the proposed solution relies on issuing X.509 digital
certificates, which allow to implement strong security mech-
anisms both within the organization and also with entities
outside it. Additionally, the proposed solution considers the
issuance of certificates with very short lifespans. In fact,
short-lived certificates improve the overall network security,
as they reduce the possibility of having compromised and
not revoked certificates. In order to enhance the performance
and scalability of IIoT identity management, the proposed
approach delegates the certificate lifecycle management to
a resource-rich edge server known as the Certificate Life-
cycle Management (CLM) server, which is located in the
boundary between the IIoT network and the corporate data
network. The CLM keeps an always up-to-date and con-
sistent inventory of organizational-level digital certificates,
which improves the security management of the organization,
and facilitates data searching, report generation, etc. This
enhances the overall security level of the whole organization,
as a good planning and management of security procedures
and cryptographic material is one of the most important
pillars of network security.
One important aspect of the proposed solution is that
although certificate management procedures are delegated to
the CLM, the private keys of the IIoT devices never leave
these devices. That is, private keys are only known by the
owner IIoT device and never communicated to the CLM. This
allows the CLM to be a just partially trusted entity and avoids
the possibility of the CLM impersonating any of the IIoT
devices.
On the other hand, taking into account that the proposed
solution targets industrial scenarios, the use of widely tested
mechanisms and standard compliance become essential
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factors. For this reason, we have designed our solution
fully based on established standards and security infrastruc-
tures, facilitating its easy and quick adoption. More specif-
ically, the communications between the IIoT devices and
the CLM are based on the Constrained Application Protocol
(CoAP) [11] and Raw Public Key (RPK)-DatagramTransport
Layer Security (DTLS) [12], [13]. To make the distribution
and verification of RPKs more efficient, an Identity Based
Cryptography (IBC) [14] solution is proposed, where the
public key of each entity is directly derived from its identity.
On the other hand, the enrolment and renewal of digital
certificates is carried out by means of the Simple Certificate
Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) [15], which is currently the
most widely supported protocol for automatic enrolment and
renewal of digital certificates.
In order to guarantee the viability of the proposed solu-
tion, a benchmarking prototype has been deployed in a
real industrial environment, specifically in the Aeronautics
Advanced Manufacturing Center (CFAA) [16]. The CFAA
was launched by the University of the Basque Country along
with a wide range of companies involved in manufacturing
and Industry 4.0 and it is financially supported by the local
and autonomous government. The final aim of the CFAA
is to raise the industrial competitiveness of the region by
promoting research and experimentation in a real environ-
ment with the most novel machinery and manufacturing tech-
niques. Therefore, its R+D+I activity is focused on TRLs
5 to 7, allowing fast transfer to the industrial fabric. The
obtained results show that the proposed system is suitable
for the targeted environments both from the functional and
performance points of view.
Therefore, the main contributions of this paper could be
summarized as follows:
• A novel, efficient and scalable identity management sys-
tem for IIoT environments based onX.509 digital certifi-
cates, including the necessary procedures and messages.
• A real-world implementation of the proposed system in
an industrial environment that acknowledges the feasi-
bility and suitability of the solution.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
summarizes the most important literature related to the
researched topic. Then, Section III reviews the most impor-
tant concepts of the technologies upon which the proposed
system is built, namely Identity Based Cryptography and
automatic enrolment protocols. Section IV defines the gen-
eral architecture of the proposed system, including all the
involved entities, while Section V details the procedures
and message exchanges designed for its operation. Next,
Section VI considers the security issues that might affect
the proposed system and how they are avoided. Section VII
details the testbed implemented and the measures carried
out to evaluate the performance of the proposed system
and assess the factors that have most impact on it. Finally,
Section VIII gathers the main conclusions of the work and
future research lines.
II. RELATED WORK
The introduction of PKIs in IoT scenarios presents impor-
tant challenges, mainly related to the resource limitations
of the involved devices and the typically very high num-
ber of devices involved. Apart from the obvious difficulties
related to the execution of asymmetric encryption algorithms
in devices with severe limitations regarding memory and
CPU, the lifecycle management of the X.509 certificates used
to distribute public keys in a trustworthy manner presents
also an important challenge, mainly due to scalability rea-
sons [10], [17]. In the same way, downloading CRLs or
executing the OCSP protocol to check the revocation status
of each received certificate are also costly tasks for IoT
devices [18], [19].
The issues related to the use of PKIs by resource-limited
IoT devices have been extensively studied in the litera-
ture [20]–[22], and many solutions have been proposed,
mainly based on the delegation of the most consuming tasks
to a resource-rich and trusted centralized entity [23]–[26].
However, the issues related to the lifecycle management of
certificates in IoT environments have received little attention
so far. In this section, we review the existing proposals to
make the lifecycle management of certificates lighter for IoT
environments.
The authors in [10] propose PKI4IoT, a contribution to
make IoT devices compatible with current PKIs. For this
purpose, the paper proposes a lightweight profile for the
compression and encoding of X.509 certificates and an auto-
matic and light enrolment protocol, suitable for massively
deployed resource-deprived devices. The proposal assumes
that IoT devices are preloaded when manufactured with a
factory certificate of the device, the corresponding private key
and at least one trusted Certificate Authority (CA) certificate.
However, this proposal is based on tailor-made protocols,
avoiding the use of standard mechanisms, which hinders its
easy adoption by industry.
Taking into account the difficulty of certificate lifecycle
management in IoT scenarios, the authors in [27] propose
TwinPeaks, an alternative to current PKIs built on Certificate-
less Public Key Cryptography (CL-PKC). In short, in order to
remove the need for PKIs and digital certificates, the proposal
is based on using public identities which are directly linked
to public keys. More specifically, public keys are generated
taking as input the corresponding public identities, such as a
fully qualified domain name, IP address, etc. One important
drawback of this approach is that both public and private
keys are generated by a centralized server, known as the Pri-
vate Key Generator (PKG). This Trusted Third Party (TTP)
gets to know the private keys of all the entities it serves,
which results in the so-called key escrow problem. Another
drawback is that for its operation, the solution requires also
the implementation of a new key server hierarchy and it
defines new specific messages for querying these key servers.
In fact, when a source A wants to obtain the public key of a
destination B, first it uses B’s identity to obtain its domain
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name, then it queries the DNS for the IP address of the key
server of B’s domain and finally, it contacts the corresponding
key server in order to obtain B’s public key.
On the other hand, in order to make the enrolment process
lighter for IoT devices, the work in [28] proposes to replace
long passphrases with short pre-shared keys or PINs in the
security mechanisms of the SCEP message exchange. These
short PINs will then feed a Password Authenticated Key
Exchange (PAKE) protocol, which in turn will derive a one-
time-secret to authenticate the actual certificate enrolment
process. As the proposed security mechanism is designed like
a wrapper around the standard SCEP protocol, it can be easily
implemented and deployed.
The paper in [29] presents the design, implementation and
evaluation of an automatic enrolment mechanism for IoT
devices. The proposed mechanism is mainly based on the
implementation of EST over CoAP/DTLS. First a PSK based
DTLS channel is established between the IoT device and
the CA. Over this secure channel, the EST PKCS #10 and
PKCS #7 request/response messages are sent. The CA ver-
ifies the request automatically, and the obtained certificate
is then used to establish certificate-based DTLS sessions
between the IoT devices and Internet hosts. The proposed
mechanism has been developed for the Contiki operating
system and successfully implemented in a devicewith a 32 kB
RAM and about 200 kB ROM. Therefore, this work mainly
addresses the performance issues of automatic enrolment
processes linked to the hardware limitations of IoT devices,
but does not considermanagement issueswhen a high number
of IoT devices are involved.
Focused on the problem of checking the revocation status
of each certificate, the work in [30] deals with the issue
of long CRLs, which exceed the available memory in IoT
devices. The authors defend the use of CRLs for checking
certificate revocation as a better option than using OCSP
for 3 reasons: (1) OCSP requires the IoT device being
online; (2) if the number of OCSP queries becomes very
large, the OCSP responder might become overwhelmed; and
(3) OCSP queries leave a trace of the IoT devices activity,
which risks its privacy. The authors propose two alternative
protocols to the conventional CRL protocol, which allow
to greatly reduce the amount of downloaded information,
reducing in this way, the used RAM and bandwidth. The
first option is based on a generalized Merkle hash tree and
the second option is based on a Bloom filter. Both protocols
are probably secure and allow parametrization to personalize
the trade-off between efficiency and security under various
conditions.
Similarly, the work in [18] presents a solution to the prob-
lem of having to transmit and store very big CRLs, which
is especially problematic in the case of resource-deprived
IoT devices. The proposed approach heavily builds on a
data structure called Distributed Hash Table (DHT), which
allows quick lookups when data is distributed amongmultiple
devices. The proposal is specifically tailored to smart meter
networks. According to the proposed solution, the CRL is
split into N portions, being N the number of smart meters in
the network, and each smart meter only stores a part of the
whole CRL. In order to distribute the revoked certificates’
identifiers among the N portions, first, each smart meter is
identified by a hash of its IP address and its public key and
a hash of each revoked certificate is also computed. Then,
the hash of each certificate is compared with the hash of
the smart meters. For this purpose, a special hash function
is used, known as Consistent Hash Function, which ensures
uniform distribution of key and value pairs on an imaginary
ring. The network gateway acts as the distributor of CRL
portions. Therefore, each smart meter just stores one portion
of the CRL, and a finger table to find other CRL portions
when they are required. To guarantee the security of the CRL
portion distribution process, these portions must be signed
with the gateway’s private key.
III. BACKGROUND TECHNOLOGIES
This section deals with the main technologies that act as
foundations for the proposed solution, namely Identity-Based
Cryptography and automatic certificate enrolment.
A. IDENTITY-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY
Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) is a particular type of
asymmetric cryptographic schema where public-private key
pairs are not randomly generated. Instead, each entity’s public
key is directly derived from its identity, such as email address,
social security number, etc. This asymmetric cryptographic
schema was first proposed by Shamir in 1984 [31] and its
main goal is to avoid the necessity of issuing and signing
digital certificates to reliably bind an identity to a public key;
and therefore, also the necessity of building and maintaining
CAhierarchies. That is, in IBC anyone can send a confidential
message to a specific destination without needing to down-
load and check digital certificates, just by using its identity
as public key. However, it was not until 17 years after Shamir
published the IBC concept that the first fully-functional IBC
implementation was developed by Boneh and Frankil [32].
For its operation, IBC requires the existence of a trusted
third party acting as a PKG, which is able to compute the
private key corresponding to each public key. For this aim,
the PKG holds a Master Public Key and a Master Secret Key
and it implements specific elliptic curves based on bilinear
pairings, such as the widely used Weil pairing [33].
IBC gathers the concepts of Identity-based Encryp-
tion (IBE) and Identity-based Signature (IBS) and differ-
ent international standardization organizations such as IETF,
IEEE and ISO/IEC have standardized several IBE and IBS
algorithms [34]–[36].
B. AUTOMATIC ENROLMENT MECHANISMS
Certificate enrolment is the process by which a user (human,
software, etc.) obtains a valid certificate from a CA. This
process is initiated by a user request including the user’s
public key, a proof of knowledge of the associated private key
and other enrolment information. When a CA receives such a
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request, if verifies the conveyed information and compares it
to its established policy rules. If the verification is successful,
the CA creates the requested certificate, posts it and sends an
identifying certificate to the user. Certificate enrolment might
be directly performed with a CA or through a Registration
Authority (RA).
Currently, a number of automatic enrolment protocols
exist, but without a doubt, the most widely deployed one
is the Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) [15].
This protocol, originally defined by Cisco, allows a device
to easily obtain a digital certificate from a trusted CA by
using a URL and a secret shared with the CA, which implies
that users must be pre-registered with the CA (share secret
keys). Then, PKI services can be configured to automatically
accept all certificate requests or to send some of them for
approval by an administrator. Although it is the most widely
used automatic enrolment protocol, it is not a standard, but
an IETF draft. The operations supported by SCEP include
certificate enrolment, certificate renewal, certificate queries,
CRL queries and distribution of CA public keys.
As an evolution of SCEP, the Enrolment over Secure
Transport (EST) [37] protocol was defined by Cisco, Akayla,
and Aruba Networks and standardized in 2013. The main
difference with respect to SCEP is that instead of using
shared secrets to guarantee the security of the communica-
tions between clients and the CA, EST implements standard
TLS as the transport security layer, which implies the neces-
sity of distributing and managing digital certificates. Another
difference of EST with respect to SCEP is that it supports
server-side key generation, which is important in the case
of IoT devices with not enough power or entropy source to
generate a random private key.
Another alternative for automatic certificate enrolment is
Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) [38]. This pro-
tocol is very similar to SCEP, but it implements a wider
range of certificate management operations that go beyond
the certificate provisioning of SCEP and EST, such as cer-
tificate revocation, status, batch requests, etc. The specifi-
cation defines a message format, message control and data
structures. In the same way as CMC, Certificate Management
Protocol (CMP) [39] also goes beyond certificate provision-
ing and it also defines its own message format. The transport
mechanism for CMP is HTTP.
On the other hand, Automated Certificate Management
Environment (ACME) [40] is a communication protocol
designed for automating the issuance and domain validation
procedures. Designed by Internet Security Research Group
(ISRG) [41] for their Let’s Encrypt service, ACME allows
to set up an HTTPS server and make it automatically obtain
a browser-trusted certificate without any human intervention.
The communication between the client and the server is based
on JSON messages over HTTPS.
Finally, Enrolment with Application Layer Security
(EALS) [42] defines a certificate enrolment protocol specif-
ically tailored to IoT constrained devices. For this reason,
it runs over CoAP and the used data format is CBOR.
Specifically, EALS defines a certificate enrolment mecha-
nism based on CMC messages and secured at the applica-
tion layer by means of OSCORE [43]. For the OSCORE
implementation, it requires that the communicating entities
share a secret key, known as the ‘‘master secret’’. For the
establishment of this pre-shared key, the use of EDHOC [44]
is proposed.
IV. GENERAL ARCHITECTURE
The aim of this section is to describe the proposed edge-based
certificate management architecture for IIoT scenarios. The
proposed architecture with the modules loaded in each entity
is graphically depicted in Figure 2. A key element of this
architecture is the Certificate Lifecycle Management (CLM)
server, located in the edge between the IIoT network and the
traditional corporate data communication network. This is
a most suitable position for the CLM to perform certificate
enrolment and renewal on behalf of the resource deprived
IIoT devices. Then, specific modules must also be loaded
in the endpoint IIoT devices as well as in the corporate CA.
Additionally, a PKG is also introduced to support the imple-
mentation of secure communications based on IBC. Given
the criticality of the services provided by this entity and the
information it stores, it is envisioned that this PKG is not
connected to the corporate network and it operates offline.
Next, the features and functions of the involved entities are
detailed.
A. CERTIFICATE LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT (CLM) SERVER
The CLM is the key element of the proposed security man-
agement system and its overall goal is to manage the certifi-
cates of all IIoT devices within the corporate network in a
secure and well-structured way. For this aim, some certificate
management functions are delegated from the endpoint IIoT
devices to the CLM. However, an important feature is that
IIoT devices’ private keys are never delegated to the CLMand
they never leave the owner IIoT device. This is an essential
point in order to preserve the end-to-end security of the
communications protected afterwards by those private keys.
The CLM stores and manages a consistent inventory with
information about all IIoT devices registered in the corporate
network, including device identity, IBC public key, digital
certificate, expiration date, and a flag indicating whether
the IIoT device is operational or not. When a IIoT device
is tagged as ‘‘operational,’’ it means that it has already
obtained a valid digital certificate from the corporate CA; in
an opposite case, it is tagged as ‘‘not operational’’. In this
way, the overall security architecture of the organization is
improved as the certificate inventory is unique, consistent
and always up-to-date; and the CLM, being a resource-rich
device, is in better position to manage the organization’s
certificates’ lifecycle: check renewal dates, start re-enrolment
process when needed, store certificates, etc.
Communications between the CLM and the endpoint
IIoT devices are based on CoAP and specifically, the CLM
implements two CoAP clients: one to request a CSR to
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FIGURE 2. General architecture of the proposed system.
be generated and signed by the corresponding IIoT device
(CSR_generation_request client) and a second one to pro-
vide the IIoT device with the CA signed certificate for its
verification and storage (verify_certificate client). Addition-
ally, these CoAP communications between the CLM and the
IIoT devices must be appropriately protected. For this aim,
a RPK-based DTLS channel is established, in which the CLM
acts as DTLS client, and therefore, it starts the DTLS hand-
shake against the DTLS servers running on the endpoint IIoT
devices. The used RPKs are based on IBC, securely linking
in this way each public key with its corresponding identity
and removing the necessity for initial certificate distribution
at the commissioning phase.
The CLM must also communicate with the corporate CA
for the automatic (re)enrolment of digital certificates on
behalf of endpoint IIoT devices. For this aim, a solution
based on the SCEP protocol has been designed. Specifically,
the CLM implements a SCEP client which generates SCEP
requests including the CSRs previously generated by the
endpoint IIoT devices. Once the CA responds with the SCEP
response including the generated and signed X.509 certifi-
cate, the CLM performs a first verification of the provided
certificate, which has been called the pre-verification step.
At this step, the CLM verifies the correct structure of the
received certificate, the included public information and the
CA signature. That is, the CLM performs all the verifica-
tions that do not require owning the IIoT device’s private
key, since this private key never leaves the IIoT device.
This pre-validation step allows filtering invalid or malformed
certificates before they reach the actual IIoT devices, there-
fore saving resources in the limited IIoT devices.
B. IIoT DEVICES
For the IIoT devices to be accepted in the proposed system
and their certificates managed by the CLM, they must own
some root security-related data and must implement some
specific services.
First, the IIoT devices must be configured with their iden-
tity, their IBC public and private keys and also the identity
and IBC public key of the CLM. All these data are loaded in
the commissioning phase, before the IIoT devices are actually
deployed into the network. Due to the criticality of the stored
data, this process is performed offline.
Additionally, the IIoT devices must also implement two
CoAP services. The first one is used to generate and
sign the corresponding CSR when the CLM asks to do
so (CSR_generation_request server). This service is pro-
grammed so that IIoT devices generate CSRs in PKCS
#10 format. The second CoAP service is used to receive
the X.509 certificates issued by the corporate CA and
forwarded by the CLM, and to verify their correctness
(verify_certificate server). This verification implies opera-
tions that require knowledge of the IIoT device’s private key,
such as the verification of the public key included in the
certificate.
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As previously explained, these CoAP communications
between the CLM and the IIoT devices are protected by
means of a RPK-based DTLS channel, for which the IIoT
devices must implement a DTLS server.
C. CORPORATE CA
For automatic certificate (re)enrolment, the CA implements
a SCEP server, which verifies each received SCEP request,
and in a successful verification case, it generates and signs the
corresponding certificate in PKCS #7 format. Then, it sends
this certificate to the CLM in a SCEP response message.
In our current implementation, the validation of the requests
sent by the CLM is based on a pre-configured password,
although more advanced mechanisms could be designed and
implemented.
D. PRIVATE KEY GENERATOR (PKG)
For the sake of scalability, the DTLS sessions between the
CLM and each IIoT device are authenticated by means of raw
public keys. These raw public keys have a special feature as
they are based on an IBC asymmetric cryptographic scheme.
More specifically, these raw public keys are directly an iden-
tifier of each user, and the corresponding private keys are
created biding this identifier with a system master secret.
This approach simplifies the distribution of root authentica-
tion credentials to each IIoT device at commissioning phase,
while it still allows to establish secure communicationswithin
the organization based on public key cryptography.
Therefore, before a new IIoT device is deployed in the
network, the PKG computes its corresponding public/private
key pair taking as input the identity of the IIoT device and a
master secret key owned by the PKG. The solution is based
on using the well known pairing-friendly curve BN254. Then,
the private and public keys are copied to the IIoT device,
while the identity of the new IIoT device along with its public
key are registered in the CLM.
As the PKG is a critical entity responsible for generating
the pairs of public and private keys that constitute the foun-
dation of the security of the proposed solution, it is an entity
that does not even need to be online.
V. LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT
This section details the procedures defined in the proposed
system for the life-cycle management of digital certificates,
which are also graphically represented in Figure 3.
A. COMMISSIONING PHASE
In the case of IIoT devices, the commissioning phase is the
last phase in the manufacturing process, or the first phase
before the actual deployment, where IIoT devices are pro-
vided with the necessary configuration to successfully oper-
ate in the targeted scenario and network. In the case of the
solution proposed in this paper, the commissioning phase is
related to registering the new device in the CLM, as well as
providing the device with an identity, an IBC public/private
key pair and basic networking configurations, such as the
identity and public key of the CLM. Additionally, if it has
not been done during the manufacturing and software image
installation, the two CoAP services designed for CSR gener-
ation and certificate verification are also installed.
The identity configuration is performed offline and aided
by the IBC PKG. In this way, the new IIoT device is provided
with an identity which the PKG uses as source information
to create the corresponding private and public keys. Then,
the new device is registered in the CLM using as entry infor-
mation its identity and its public key, and the device is marked
as ‘‘not operational,’’ as it does not own yet a valid digital
certificate that would allow it to securely communicate with
any other entity within or outside the corporate network.
At this point, the CLM initiates the delegated enrolment
process in order to allow the device to move from ‘‘not
operational’’ to ‘‘operational’’ state, which is achieved when
the device owns a valid digital certificate.
B. CERTIFICATE ENROLMENT AND RENEWAL
After the commissioning phase, the new IIoT device is reg-
istered in the CLM with a ‘‘not operational’’ state. So the
CLM initiates the enrolment process as detailed in Figure 3.
For this aim, the CLM first establishes a RPK-based DTLS
channel with the affected IIoT device, using as the receiver’s
public key, the IBC public key computed from the identity
of the corresponding IIoT device. Then, the CLM uses the
just established DTLS channel to securely send a query to
the CSR_generation_request CoAP service running within
the IIoT device. This request conveys the CA certificate and
might also enclose the information to include in the CSR
request.
Upon reception of a CSR_generation_request, the IIoT
device creates a new public/private key pair and generates
a new PKCS #10 CSR, signed with its private key. The
information included in the CSR can be either the default
information configured in the IIoT device or the information
sent along with the query message. Once the signed PKCS
#10 CSR is generated, it is sent to the CLM as a response to
the received CSR_generation_request.
When the CLM receives the PKCS #10 CSR signed by
the IIoT device, it encloses it in a new SCEP client request
and sends it to the CA. The CA, in turn, verifies the request
against its enrolment policy, and if the verification is suc-
cessful, it signs the requested certificate and returns it to
the CLM in PKCS #7 format. Although more sophisticated
enrolment policies can be developed, in our current approach,
communications between the CLM and the CA are password-
protected; and the CA takes as trustworthy any enrolment
request coming from the CLM and protected with the right
password.
When the CLM receives the PKCS #7 signed certificate
issued by the CA, if verifies the format of the certificate
and the signature of the CA in a pre-verification process.
However, it cannot verify any of the fields protected with
the public key of the endpoint IIoT device, as it does not
own the IIoT device’s private key. Therefore, it forwards the
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FIGURE 3. Message exchange of the proposed system.
obtained PKCS #7 signed certificate to the IIoT device for
its final verification. For this aim, the CLM first establishes
a RPK-based DTLS channel with the targeted IIoT device,
using as public key the IBC key derived from the IIoT
device’s identity. Then, it uses the established secure channel
to invoke the verify_certificate CoAP service, including in
the request message the just obtained PKCS #7 certificate.
Finally, the IIoT device verifies the PKCS #7 certificate using
the public key of the CA and its own private key and responds
to the CLM with a code that indicates if the verification has
been successful or not.
If the verification of the obtained certificate ends up suc-
cessfully, the CLM marks the IIoT device as ‘‘operational’’
and registers the enrolment time and the validity period of
the certificate, in order to start the renewal process when
necessary. In the case that the verification failed, the CLM
restarts the enrolment process up to a pre-established number
of attempts, after which a notification is sent to the network
administrator.
The renewal process consists basically of a new enrol-
ment process, triggered when the certificate expiration date
approaches. This process is controlled by the CLM, releasing
the resource-limited IIoT devices from the responsibility of
permanently checking the validity of their certificates. This
is a suitable solution because many IIoT devices do not even
have a clock with the current time to check the expiration date
of their certificates.
VI. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
The proposed solution is heavily based on standard and
long-tested technologies, which have been extensively
analysed from the security point of view. Nevertheless,
the modifications introduced to enable the delegated auto-
matic enrolmentmay incur in new vulnerabilities, whichmust
also be considered. Therefore, in this section we focus on
identifying and analysing the potential security risks that
may arise from the new entities and services defined in the
proposed system. The goal is not perform a low-level formal
security evaluation of the whole system, but to assess from a
high-level point of view the security of the newly introduced
elements and services. Additionally, we do not consider secu-
rity risks associated to the operating systems used for testbed
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implementation or security vulnerabilities associated to the
specific hardware used.
A. CLM
The proposed approach consists of delegating the enrolment
request to an edge server known as the CLM. However,
the CLM may behave maliciously and try to snoop on trans-
mitted messages or modify them. The first type of attack
related to traffic monitoring does not constitute a real risk,
since the request information transmitted by the end IIoT
device and the certificate generated by the CA as a response,
contain both of them, public information. Regarding the
potential risk of the CLM modifying or injecting new mes-
sages, this is avoided by the fact that private keys are never
delegated to the CLMor any other third party. This means that
transmitted messages are verified end-to-end by the end IIoT
device and the CA, and the CLM is not able to modify any
message without it being easily detected when the signature
is verified. That is, each party owns a private key which never
leaves the owner device. Additionally, the request sent by
the client IIoT device is signed using its private key, which
removes the possibility of any intermediate entity, including
the CLM, modifying the request message in a way that it goes
undetected. Similarly, the response message generated by the
CA is also signed by the issuing entity. As signatures are
verified in the receiving entities, any modification to either
the request or response message would be detected.
B. NEW CoAP SEVICES
In order to support the proposed solution, IIoT devices are
configured at commissioning phase with two new CoAP ser-
vices: one, to generate a new PKCS #10 CSR; and the second
one, to validate the PKCS #7 format response provided by
the CA. These two CoAP services are protected by means
of RPK-based DTLS connections. As the DTLS connections
are established using IBC-based public keys, each endpoint’s
public key is directly linked to its identity, which allows
to automatically authenticate each endpoint’s identity. Addi-
tionally, once the DTLS connection is established, the CoAP
information transmitted over it is automatically encrypted
and integrity-protected by means of the DTLS record proto-
col. In this way, the use of RPK-based DTLS connections for
the protection of CoAP services implicitly removes the poten-
tial vulnerability of these services, as DTLS is an extensively
validated standard security protocol, which additionally has
been specifically designed to protect CoAP communications.
C. IIoT DEVICES
IIoT devices are traditionally difficult to protect. On the
one hand, the resource limitations of these devices imply
that most of the current security mechanisms, designed for
resource-rich devices, are not directly applicable to the IIoT
world. Additionally, the massive deployment of IIoT devices
makes harder the management of the security in these envi-
ronments. In this context, the solution presented in this paper
entails a step forward towards the protection and availability
of strong security mechanisms in IIoT devices. On the one
hand, the proposed solution allows IIoT devices to securely
obtain a digital certificate, which is a key element for the sub-
sequent implementation of authentication and encryption-key
negotiation mechanisms. In this way, IIoT devices are able to
implement strong security mechanisms, which reduce their
vulnerability window and exposure to attacks. On the other
hand, the proposed solution also improves themanagement of
the security in scenarios with a high number of deployed IIoT
devices, since certificate enrolment and renewal are managed
in a consistent way by a resource-rich edge server.
VII. FUNCTIONAL AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In order to assess the feasibility and suitability of the pro-
posed solution, we have deployed it in the CFFA [16],
an advanced manufacturing center launched by the Univer-
sity of the Basque Country along with a wide range of
companies of the sector and supported by the local and
Basque governments. The CFAA is connected to the Faculty
of Engineering of Bilbao (EIB) (about 18 Kms away) and
the headquarters of the University of the Basque Country
in Leioa (about 15 Kms away) by means of the SN4I [45]
experimental facility. SN4I is an experimental network based
on Network Function Virtualization (NFV), Software Defied
Networking (SDN) and 5G technologies aimed at supporting
innovative Industry 4.0 developments and deployments. SN4I
interconnects the three premises at Layer 2 and at a data
rate of 10 Gbps, by means of fiber optic links and a set of
OpenFlow switches. Additionally, the Faculty of Engineer-
ing and CFAA sites include 5G access. On the other hand,
in each location a virtual infrastructure node, managed by the
OpenStack Virtual Infrastructura Manager (VIM), has been
deployed; and the three OpenStack nodes are managed by
an ETSI Open Source MANO (OSM) [46] Management and
Orchestration (MANO) system located in the premises of the
Faculty of Engineering of Bilbao.
In such a context, the deployed testbed consists of a Rasp-
berry Pi acting as IIoT device and the CLM and CA services
deployed as two Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) in the
OpenStack node of the CFAAandmanaged by the ETSIOSM
MANO. The selection of the Raspberry Pi as IIoT device
has been motivated by the flexibility it provides for research
tasks, specifically the wide availability of software and cryp-
tographic libraries and the easy installation and programming
of new services and functionalities.
Apart from providing a real-world functional validation of
the proposed solution, the implemented testbed is also used to
carry out a performance evaluation, mainly focused on mea-
suring the operational delays incurred by the different phases
of the proposed system. In fact, the proposed solution is
based on issuing short-lived certificates in order to minimize
the possibility of compromised certificates being used as
valid. This means that the issued certificates have short lifes-
pans, so that they expire before they could be compromised.
As a result, certificate re-enrolments occur very frequently.
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For this reason, it is important to assess that these
re-enrolments do not entail a bottle neck.
A. TESTBED IMPLEMENTATION
This section details the setting environment for the perfor-
mance evaluation carried out. In order to assess the feasibility
of the proposed architecture, we have implemented a testbed
consisting of three machines: a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B
acting as IIoT device, a virtual machine running Ubuntu
20.04 to implement the CLM, and a second virtual machine
running Debian 10.6 in order to execute the CA. Communi-
cations between them are carried out through a SN4I infras-
tructure, where the raspberry accesses the infrastructure by
means of WiFi. The overall implemented testbed is depicted
in Figure 4.
For the implementation of the CA functions, we have
selected the OpenXPKI - Version 3.8.0 CA [47], because to
the best of our knowledge, it is the only open source alterna-
tive that implements the standard SCEP automatic enrolment
protocol. We have created a RA and a CA hierarchy consist-
ing of two CAs.
The CLM implements the delegated enrolment functional-
ity based on the CertNanny SCEP client software, Version
1.2.0 [48]. In fact, this client software has been selected
because the OpenXPKI CA has been tested to run success-
fully with it. However, in order to allow for a delegated enrol-
ment, the original CertNanny software has been modified
at two specific points: (1) CSR obtaining and (2) certificate
verification. The first modification involves the CertNanny
client establishing a CoAP communication with the corre-
sponding IIoT device in order to obtain a CSR signed by the
device. Then, the CertNanny client uses this CSR obtained
from the IIoT device to generate the SCEP request and sends
it to the CA, following its normal operation. Once it receives
the SCEP response from the CA, the CertNanny client
pre-verifies the enclosed PKCS #7 certificate with the public
information it has available. The whole verification of the
obtained PKCS #7 certificate implies the secondmodification
to the original SCEP client program.More specifically, at this
point, the SCEP client establishes a second CoAP connection
with the IIoT device, forwards the PKCS #7 certificate and
waits for a response from the IIoT device, indicating if the
verification has been successful or not. In order to perform
specific cryptographic operations, such as the pre-validation
of the certificate received from the CA or the storage of
the certificates successfully validated by the IIoT device,
the modified SCEP client program invokes the corresponding
OpenSSL commands.
Additionally, in order to establish the aforementioned
CoAP communications, the CLM implements the corre-
sponding CoAP clients, which first invoke a DTLS client in
order to secure these communications.
The IIoT device implements two CoAP servers with their
corresponding DTLS servers in order to protect these com-
munications. The first CoAP server receives CSR generation
requests sent by the CLM and invokes the corresponding
OpenSSL commands to generate the required private/public
key pair and the PKCS #10 CSR. Then, it responds to the
CoAP request by sending the generated CSR. The second
CoAP server receives the PKCS #7 certificate generated by
the CA and forwarded by the CLM and validates the infor-
mation contained in it. For this aim, it invokes the necessary
OpenSSL commands. Then, it responds to the CLM by indi-
cating if the validation has been successful or not.
For the implementation of the secure CoAP communica-
tions between the IIoT device and the CLM, the Eclipse Cali-
fornium Java-based CoAP framework [49], Version 2.5.0, has
been used for the development of the corresponding CoAP
andDTLS clients and servers. Finally, for the implementation
of the PKG in charge of generating the public/private key
pairs used in IBC, the MIRACL Crypto SDK C software
library [50], Version 4.0, has been used.
B. EXPERIMENTS
In order to assess the performance of our identity manage-
ment solution, we have measured the time taken by the
process at its different stages. We have split the delegated
enrolment process in the following steps, which are also
graphically represented in Figure 4 with square boxes of
dashed lines:
1) CoAP CSR_generation_request: this step corresponds
to the time taken by the CoAP communication between
the CLM and the IIoT device in order to request the
IIoT device to generate a new CSR and send it to the
CLM. The main contribution to this time is the DTLS
handshake process.
2) Private key and CSR generation: this step is performed
at the IIoT device after the reception of a request to
its CSR_generation_request CoAP service. It implies,
first, the generation of a public/private key pair, which
is the most costly operation; and then, the generation
and signing of the corresponding PKCS #10 CSR.
3) Delegated enrolment: this steps gathers the time taken
by the execution of the CertNanny SCEP client at the
CLM. It starts with the generation of the SCEP request
based on the PKCS #10 CSR generated by the IIoT
device and finalises once the PKCS #7 certificate has
been received from the CA and pre-validated.
4) CoAP verify_certificate: this step corresponds to
the second CoAP communication between the CLM
and the IIoT device, where the CLM sends to the
IIoT device the PKCS #7 certificate provided by the
CA. As in the case of the first CoAP communication,
the main time contribution is also the associated DTLS
handshake.
5) Certificate verification: this step accounts for the time
taken by the IIoT device in order to validate the infor-
mation contained in the PKCS #7 certificate generated
by the CA and forwarded by the CLM.
Additionally, we have considered different cryptographic
conditions, in order to evaluate the impact of each of them
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FIGURE 4. Implemented testbed and performed experiments.
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FIGURE 5. Results of the performance evaluation for above described experiments and different configurations of the cryptographic
mechanisms. Each chart specifies performed operation and involved entities.
in the performance of the solution. Specifically, we have
considered different values for the following parameters:
• Authenticationmechanism used in theDTLS handshake:
we have considered two different authentication mech-
anisms for the DTLS connections established between
IIoT devices and the CLM. Specifically, we have con-
sidered the use of PSKs and RPKs in order to assess the
impact of using public key cryptography with respect to
the most efficient mechanisms of using symmetric key
cryptography.
• Length of the AES key used for symmetric encryption in
the DTLS record protocol: Once the DTLS handshake
has finished, AES GCM-based symmetric key encryp-
tion is used by the DTLS record protocol in order to
protect the confidentiality and integrity of the CoAP
communications. In this case, we have considered the
use of 128 and 256 bit-length symmetric keys.
• Length of the public/private key pairs generated by the
IIoT: we have considered the use of 1024 and 2048 bit
lengths for the keys to be included in the requested
certificates.
C. OBTAINED RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The implemented testbed has demonstrated that the proposed
solution is feasible, easily deployable, secure, efficient and
highly scalable. The results of the tests carried out have been
gathered in Figure 5 and Table 1, where the execution times
measured for the previously defined steps and depending
on the selected parameters have been collected. In order to
obtain the represented results, experiments with each specific
configuration have been repeated 100 times. Figure 5 allows
an easy visual interpretation of the obtained mean values and
95% confidence intervals. Table 1, in turn, provides more
precise numerical results, including also standard deviations.
The measured results show that the factor that has a greater
impact on the execution times is the length of the asymmetric
keys used for the certificate generation; specially when it is
the resource-deprived IIoT device the entity that must com-
pute it and use it to perform cryptographic operations. In fact,
as shown in Figure 5a generating a 2048 bit private key in the
IIoT device implies nearly 5 times more time than generating
a 1024 bit private key. Similarly, the results in Figure 5c show
that using a 2048 bit length private key implies an increase of
about 40% in the time needed by the IIoT device to verify the
PKCS #7 certificate. On the other hand, Figure 5a also shows
that the creation of the private key in the IIoT device is also
the operation that entails a greater time variability, which is
more evident in the case of 2048 bit length keys.
Another important conclusion of the obtained results is that
the use of RPKs for the DTLS handshake implies similar
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TABLE 1. Obtained results of the performance evaluation. Mean value, standard deviation and 95% confidence interval of 100 measures for each specific
configuration and each measured parameter.
delays to using PSKs, as demonstrated in Figures 5d and 5e.
This means that the proposed usage of asymmetric cryptogra-
phy for authentication during the DTLS handshakes does not
have a significant negative impact over the performance of
the overall solution with respect to the most efficient solution:
the use of symmetric key cryptography based on pre-shared
secrets. Similarly, the use of 128 or 256 bit AES symmetric
keys for the execution of the DTLS record protocol does not
have a big impact on the duration of the protected CoAP
communications. Therefore, the most secure configuration
based on 256 bit keys should be the preferred option.
It is also relevant to note the high contribution of the
two CoAP communications in the overall execution time of
the solution (see Figures 5d, 5e and 5f). The performance
of the CoAP communications is mainly dominated by the
handshake processes of the DTLS connections established to
protect them, which emphasizes the high performance cost of
theDTLS protocol, specially when resource-deprived devices
are involved.
All in all, the whole enrolment process takes about
10 seconds in the worst case, which is a very short time that
endorses the feasibility of performing frequent re-enrolments
in order to support the use of very short-lived certificates,
increasing in this way the overall security of the network.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Industry 4.0 is the era of IIoT and interconnected machines
and processes; and its success will not be possible if net-
work and data security are not guaranteed. In this context,
identity management, commonly linked to the distribution
andmanagement of X.509 digital certificates, presents impor-
tant challenges for the organizations. Individual digital cer-
tificates must be issued for each user, machine or process
within the organization and therefore, their management is
specially troublesome in scenarios involving massive IIoT
deployments, such as Industry 4.0.
In order to solve this problem, in this paper we present
an edge-based certificate management system, which relies
on the delegation of the certificate (re)enrolment processes
from IIoT devices to a resource-rich edge server, called CLM.
The CLM is responsible for maintaining an up-to-date and
consistent inventory of issued certificates, checking expi-
ration times and triggering renewal processes when neces-
sary. In this way, the complexity of certificate management
is concentrated on the CLM; and the operation of the
resource-limited IIoT devices is simplified, relieving them
from complex processing tasks, which frequently require
checking current time and date.
Additionally, the used certificates are short-lived, which
simplifies certificate management by eliminating the need
to notify compromised certificates, maintain CRLs and
use protocols such as OCSP, which have proved to be
resource-expensive and of limited effectiveness. Instead,
the use of short-lived certificates results in frequent certificate
renewal, which inherently reduces the possibility of certifi-
cates being compromised before they expire. In this way,
limited IIoT devices do not need to store long CRLs or to
execute complex protocols, such as OCSP.
On the other hand, the proposed solution is fully based on
standards and widely tested technologies, which perfectly fits
the industrial environment.
In order to proof the feasibility of our solution and assess
its performance, we have implemented a testbed in a real
industrial environment specifically devoted to innovation and
experimentation. The obtained results show that the proposed
system is fully adequate for the targeted scenarios, easy to
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deploy, secure and scalable. Therefore, the proposed system
provides an efficient mechanism to support large scale IoT
identity management in the Industry 4.0 era.
The work gathered here presents an initial prototype which
will be enhanced in future work with more advanced mech-
anisms to authenticate the enrolment request issued by the
CLM, which is now based on a pre-shared password between
the CLM and the CA. Additionally, support for additional
automatic enrolment protocols, such as EST, will be added.
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